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Tim. TIME WHEN A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT MAY BE HEARD IN
WVEsT ViRGiNI.-The proceeding for obtaining judgment by mo-
tion, in lieu of an action at law, adopted in chapter 121 of the
West Virginia Code from the Code of Virginia; is recognized as a
plain instance of code pleading, although prevailing in essentially
common-law states.1 In the Virginia Code of 1849, the provisions
of which received construction in the leading case of Hale v. Cham-
berlain,' the statute provided that the defendant should have sixty
days' notice of the time when the motion would be made. The
statute further provided that the notice should be returned to the
clerk's office forty days before the motion should be heard.3 In
Hale v. Chamberlain the court emphasizes the fact that the primary
object of the statute was "to simplify and shorten pleadings and
other proceedings," but not necessarily to shorten the time within
which a case might go on the docket for a hearing. In fact, it is said
that "the legislature, from analogy to the time usually required to
get an action on the docket, fixed the time of the notice at sixty days,
I Burks, Pleading and Practice, 159.
2 18 Grat. 658 (Va. 1857).
B Va. Code, 1849, c, 167, 1 5.
1
et al.: Masthead Volume 30, Issue 1
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1923
